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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
 
 
IN RE: GOOGLE INC. GMAIL LITIGATION   
_______________________________________
 
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: 
ALL ACTIONS 
            
)
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
Case No.: 13-MD-02430-LHK
 
 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 
MOTION FOR CLASS 
CERTIFICATION 
 
  
 In this consolidated multi-district litigation, Plaintiffs Keith Dunbar, Brad Scott, Todd 
Harrington, Ronald Kovler, Matthew Knowles, A.K. (next friend to Minor J.K.), Brent Matthew 
Scott, Robert Fread, and Rafael Carrillo, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated 
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), allege that Defendant Google, Inc., has violated state and federal anti-
wiretapping laws in its operation of Gmail, an email service. See ECF No. 98-4 (“FACC”). 
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, in which Plaintiffs move to 
certify four Classes and three Subclasses. See ECF No. 87-26 (“Mot.”). Google has filed an 
Opposition, see ECF No. 101-2 (“Opp.”), and Plaintiffs have filed a Reply, see ECF No. 112-2 
(“Reply”). The Court held a hearing on the Motion on February 27, 2014. See ECF No. 148 
(“Tr.”). Having considered the briefing, the record in this case, and the oral arguments presented at 
the hearing, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 A.  Factual Background  
 Plaintiffs challenge Google’s operation of Gmail under state and federal anti-wiretapping 
laws. In the FACC, Plaintiffs seek damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief on behalf of a 
number of classes of individuals who either use Gmail or exchange messages with those who use 
Gmail for Google’s interception of emails over a period of several years. FACC ¶¶ 254-349. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs state causes of action under (1) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
of 1985 (“ECPA” or “the Wiretap Act”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (2012); (2) California’s 
Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code §§ 630 et seq. (West 2014); (3) Maryland’s 
Wiretap Act, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402 (West 2013); and (4) Florida’s Wiretap 
Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 934.01 (2013). FACC ¶¶ 8-14. 
  1. Email Users Implicated 
 Google’s operation of Gmail implicates several different groups of email users, whose 
interactions with Google’s processes are slightly different. Accordingly, the Court begins by 
providing background on the types of email users implicated in this litigation and explaining the 
agreements with Google that each of these types of users encounter as they set up their email 
accounts.  
 First, Google provides a free web-based email service called Gmail. ECF No. 103-1, 
(“Chin Decl.”) ¶ 2. Users of this service can sign up for an “@gmail.com” account on a Google 
webpage, titled “Create an Account.” Id. ¶ 10. In the process of creating an account, users of 
Google’s free Gmail service (to whom the Court will refer as “Gmail users”) must check a box 
indicating that they agree to be bound by Google’s Terms of Service (“TOS”) and Privacy Policy. 
Id. ¶ 9. The “Create an Account” page links to webpages containing the relevant TOS and Privacy 
Policy. See id., Ex. F. Named Plaintiff J.K. went through this process to create the Gmail account at 
issue in the instant litigation. Id. ¶ 10. 
Case5:13-md-02430-LHK   Document158   Filed03/18/14   Page2 of 41
 
 
 
3 
Case No.:  13-MD-02430-LHK 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
 Second, Google offers a service known as “Google Apps” to customers including 
businesses, educational organizations, and internet service providers (“ISPs”). Id. ¶ 3. Through 
Google Apps, these customers can provide Google services, including Gmail, Google Calendar, 
and Google Docs, to their employees, students, or customers (to whom the Court refers as “end 
users”). Id. The end users do not receive “@gmail.com” email addresses. Id. Rather, their email 
addresses contain the domain name of the entity that contracts with Google to provide the services. 
Id. The business or educational institution that contracts with Google for Google Apps (to whom 
the Court refers as “Google Apps Administrators”) is responsible for overseeing the creation of the 
accounts of end users. Id.  
The instant litigation concerns two sets of Google Apps end users. The first set is comprised 
of end users of Cable One, an ISP that contracts with Google to provide Google Apps-related 
services to its customers. FACC ¶ 99. Cable One contracted with Google and agreed to ensure that 
its end users agreed to the Google Apps TOS, which are, in all respects relevant to the instant 
litigation, identical to the Gmail TOS. Id. Importantly, Google’s agreement with Cable One 
precludes Google from displaying advertisements in connection with the Google Apps services. 
ECF No. 86-16 (“Rommel Decl.”), Ex. Q ¶ 1.7. Named Plaintiff Keith Dunbar is a Cable One 
customer who seeks to represent a class of Cable One end users. FACC ¶ 8. 
 The second set of Google Apps end users in this litigation are Google Apps for Education 
users. Like Cable One, educational institutions that provide Google Apps services agreed, in their 
contracts with Google, to obtain the necessary authorization from end users to enable Google to 
provide the services. Chin Decl. ¶¶ 3-4. The contracts further required Google to comply with 
Google’s Privacy Policies. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Moreover, like Cable One end users, Google Apps for 
Education end users also did not receive advertisements. FACC ¶ 244. Named Plaintiff Rafael 
Carrillo, who was a student of the University of the Pacific, and named Plaintiff Robert Fread, a 
student at the University of Hawaii, were end users of Google Apps for Education as a result of 
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those institutions’ use of Google Apps. Id. ¶¶ 223-44. Fread and Carrillo now seek to represent a 
class of Google Apps for Education end users. Id. ¶ 13. 
 Third, Plaintiffs include individuals who do not use any of Google’s services, but are 
nevertheless impacted by the interceptions because these individuals send emails to or receive 
emails from Gmail users. Id. ¶¶ 251-53. The Court will refer to these individuals, whom named 
Plaintiffs Brad Scott, Todd Harrington, Ronald Kovler, Matthew Knowles, and Brent Scott seek to 
represent, as “non-Gmail users.” Id. 
  2.  The Operation of Gmail and Accused Devices 
 Google’s processing of Gmail has changed twice during the class periods: in  2010 
and  20 . FACC ¶¶ 39, 79. While Plaintiffs have accused various steps of the Gmail 
processing of unlawful interceptions in their pleadings, they clarify the scope of their contentions 
in their Reply in support of the instant Motion. Reply at 6. Specifically, Plaintiffs clarify that 
Google’s processing of emails with respect to only two sets of email transmission is at issue. Id.  
First, Plaintiffs are concerned with the processing of emails sent to Gmail users by putative Class 
members who are Gmail users, Google Apps users, or non-Gmail users. Id. Second, Plaintiffs are 
concerned with the processing of email messages received by putative Class members who are 
Google Apps and Gmail users. Id. Plaintiffs clarify that these two sets of challenged interceptions 
occur as a result of three devices that process Google’s emails: (1) Content Onebox (“COB”), (2) 
Medley Server, and (3) Changeling. Id. n.18. Accordingly, Plaintiffs clarify that they are not 
seeking to certify classes to accuse the CAT2 Mixer, which had previously been accused, of 
unlawful interceptions.1 Id. 
 With respect to Google’s processes before  2010, Plaintiffs contend that Google 
used the CAT2 Mixer, Medley Server, and ICEbox Server to read the content of emails received by 
                                                          
1 The CAT2 Mixer processes emails sent from an @gmail.com account, which Plaintiffs have not 
challenged here, and also had a role in the processing of messages received by @gmail.com 
accounts before  2010, as discussed in this section.  
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@gmail.com email addresses for keywords. FACC ¶¶ 25-30. Plaintiffs contend that Google 
extracted concepts from the content of the emails. FACC ¶¶ 25-28; Mot. at 4. Moreover, Plaintiffs 
contend that Google acquired metadata from the content of the email messages, and that this 
metadata was stored in secret user profiles. FACC ¶¶ 73-78; Mot at 4, 6.  
 
 
 
  
 Between  2010 and  20 , Plaintiffs contend that Google routed all emails 
received by Gmail users  through the COB. FACC ¶ 39; Mot. at 4. 
Through the COB, Plaintiffs contend, Google acquired message content and meaning even when 
the user was not receiving a personalized advertisement. Id. The information that the COB 
extracted was used to create metadata and annotations, which are allegedly stored in secret user 
profiles. FACC ¶¶ 73-78; Mot. at 5. 
 Finally, with respect to post-  20  processing, Plaintiffs contend that Google 
moved the COB . FACC ¶ 79; Mot. at 
5-6.  
.2 FACC ¶ 89; Mot. at 5-6.  
  3.  Google’s Disclosures 
 Google points to a number of documents publically available through its various webpages 
that discuss the challenged interceptions at issue in the instant litigation to contend that its users 
were aware of the interceptions. While it is clear that Gmail users had to indicate that they read 
some of these disclosures as part of the account registration process, it is not clear from the record 
                                                          
2 In their Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs also suggest that transcribed phone calls through 
Google Voice are subject to COB processing. Mot. at 6. However, this theory appears nowhere in 
the FACC, and the Court therefore does not consider it here.  
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to which disclosures the two groups of Google Apps users were exposed in their account-
registration process. Accordingly, the Court discusses disclosures to the two sets of Google Apps 
users separately below.  
 First, Google points to the TOS to which all Gmail users had to agree to create a Gmail 
account. Gmail users were alerted to the TOS when they created a Gmail account. Chin Decl. ¶ 9. 
The first TOS was in effect from April 16, 2007, to March 1, 2012; the second was in effect from 
March 1, 2012 to November 11, 2013; and a third has been in effect since November 11, 2013. Id. 
¶¶ 14-15. The 2007 TOS stated that: 
 
Google reserves the right (but shall have no obligation) to pre-screen, review, 
flag, filter, modify, refuse or remove any or all Content from any Service.  For 
some Services, Google may provide tools to filter out explicit sexual content.  
These tools include the SafeSearch preference settings . . . . In addition, there are 
commercially available services and software to limit access to material that you 
may find objectionable.  
 
Chin Decl., Ex. G, ¶ 8.3. A subsequent section of the 2007 TOS provided that “[s]ome of the 
Services are supported by advertising revenue and may display advertisements and promotions” 
and that “[t]hese advertisements may be content-based to the content information stored on the 
Services, queries made through the Service or other information.” Id. ¶ 17.1 
The 2012 TOS deleted all of the above language and stated that users “give Google (and 
those [Google] work[s] with) a worldwide license to use . . ., create derivative works (such as those 
resulting from translations, adaptations or other changes we make so that your content works better 
with our Services), . . . and distribute such content.” Id., Ex. H. The 2013 TOS is, for purposes of 
the instant litigation, identical to the 2012 TOS. Id. ¶ 15 n.5. 
Second, Google had in place several Privacy Policies during the class periods. The TOS 
referred users to the Privacy Policies. Id. ¶ 14. The Privacy Policies in effect from August 8, 2008, 
to October 3, 2010 stated that Google may collect “[i]nformation you provide, [c]ookies[,] [l]og 
information[,] [u]ser communications . . . to Google[,] [a]ffiliated sites, [l]inks[,] [and] [o]ther 
sites.” Id., Ex. I. Google described that it used such information for the purposes of “[p]roviding 
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our services to users, including the display of customized content and advertising.” Id. In 2010, 
Google updated the Policy to state that the collected information would be used to “[p]rovide, 
maintain, protect, and improve our services (including advertising services) and develop new 
services.” Id., Ex. K. Importantly, for all of these policies, under the heading of “User 
Communications,” which Google collected, Google stated that “[w]hen you send email or other 
communications to Google, we may retain those communications in order to process your inquires, 
respond to your requests and improve our services.” Id., Exs. I-K. Google combined various 
product-specific Privacy Policies on March 1, 2012. The purpose of the combination was to allow 
Google to integrate user data collected from its various products.3 In that Privacy Policy, Google 
eliminated the “User Communications” from the enumerated list of types of data that Google said 
it collected. Id., Ex. L.  
Third, the Privacy Policies in place from August 7, 2008 to March 1, 2012 also 
incorporated product-specific privacy notices, such as two Gmail Privacy Notices that were in 
place until October 3, 2010. Id. ¶ 20; id., Exs. M, N. The Gmail Privacy Notices stated that 
“Google records information such as account activity (including storage usage, number of log-ins), 
data displayed or clicked on (including UI [user interface] elements, ads, links); and other log 
information (including browser type, IP-address, date and time of access, cookie ID, and referrer 
URL).” Id. The Notices went on to state that “Google’s computers process the information in your 
messages for various purposes, including formatting and displaying the information to you, 
delivering advertisements and related links, preventing unsolicited bulk email (spam), backing up 
your messages, and other purposes relating to offering you Gmail.”4 Id.  
                                                          
3 The change in the Privacy Policy is the subject of litigation pending before Magistrate Judge 
Grewal. See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. 12-1382, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 3, 2013). 
4 Google cites again, as it did in connection with the Motion to Dismiss, a “Legal Notice” that 
states that “Google does not claim any ownership in any of the content, including any text, data, 
information, images, photographs, music, sound, video, or other material, that [users] upload, 
transmit or store in [their] Gmail account.” Chin Decl. ¶ 22; id., Ex. O. The Notice further stated 
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Fourth, Google maintained a series of Help pages designed to provide users information on 
various subjects. Id. ¶ 24. The first of these pages, which was accessible through a link on the 
Create an Account” page that Gmail users utilized from June 2009 to June 2012, stated that “[i]n 
Gmail, ads are related to the content of your messages” and that “[a]d targeting in Gmail is fully 
automated and no humans read your email in order to target advertisements or related 
information.” Id. ¶ 25; id., Ex. P. Another Help page, titled “More on Gmail and Privacy,” states 
that “[e]mail messages remain strictly between the sender and intended recipients” except in certain 
limited circumstances. Id., Ex. R. “These exceptions include requests by users that Google’s 
support staff access their email message in order to diagnose problems; when Google is required by 
law to do so; and when we are compelled to disclose personal information because we reasonably 
believe it’s necessary in order to protect the rights, property or safety of Google, its users and the 
public.” Id. The “More on Gmail and Privacy” Help page went on to state that “[i]n Gmail, users 
will see text ads and links to related pages that are relevant to the content of their messages.” Id. A 
third Help page, titled “Gmail, Security & Privacy,” states that “Gmail scans and processes all 
messages using fully automated systems in order to do useful and innovative stuff like filter spam, 
detect viruses and malware, show relevant ads, and develop and deliver new features across your 
Google experience.” Id. ¶ 28. A fourth page, titled “Ads on Google search, Gmail, and certain other 
Google websites,” states that “[w]hen we personalize ads, we display ads based on the contents of 
all your emails.” Id. ¶ 30.  
Fifth, Google maintained two other pages for short periods that contained information about 
targeted advertising. The first, a page titled “Privacy Center” that was available from July 2011 to 
June 2012, stated that “Google scans the text of Gmail messages in order to filter spam and detect 
viruses. The Gmail filtering system also scans keywords in users’ email which are then used to 
match and serve ads.” Id. ¶ 32. The second, a page titled “Your Data on Google: Advertising,” 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
that Google “will not use any of [users’] content for any purpose except to provide [users] with the 
service.” Id., Ex. O.  
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which was available from October 2011 to February 2013, stated that “[i]n Gmail, ads are related 
to the content of your messages.” Id. ¶ 33.  
Sixth, Google’s Ad Preferences Manager, which was launched in 2009, had a webpage for 
“Ads on Search and Gmail” that stated that “[w]ith personalized ads, we can improve your ad 
experience by showing you ads related to websites you visit, recent searches and clicks, or 
information from your Gmail inbox.” Id. ¶¶ 40, 42. Another webpage, “About Ads Settings” stated 
that “[t]he ads you see [in Gmail] may be based on many of the same factors as ads in Google 
Search as well as additional factors like the messages in your inbox.” Id. ¶ 43. The webpage 
provided an example: “You’ve recently received lots of messages about photography and cameras. 
In Gmail, you may see an ad with a deal from a local camera store.” Id. 
Seventh, Google points to certain disclosures within the Gmail interface. Id. ¶ 54. Ads in 
Gmail are accompanied by a “Why this ad?” link, which when clicked displays a pop up that states 
that “[t]his ad is based on mails from your mailbox” and links to the Ads Preferences Managers 
discussed above. Id. ¶¶ 55-57. Moreover, from January 26, 2012 to March 1, 2012, Google 
advertised its new Privacy Policy on various Google websites and through a direct email to all 
Gmail users. Id. ¶¶ 48, 51. This email contained links to the TOS, Privacy Policy, Help pages, and 
Ad Preferences Manager. Id., Ex. HH. 
Eighth, Google cites blog posts and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings 
as additional disclosures of its alleged interceptions of emails. Id. ¶ 34. A January 20, 2010 blog 
post on the Official Gmail Blog informed users that “[w]hen you open a message in Gmail, you 
often see ads related to that email. Let’s say you’re looking at a confirmation email from a hotel in 
Chicago. Next to your email, you might see ads about flights to Chicago.” Id. ¶ 35. Moreover, 
Google cites one sentence of a more than one hundred page SEC filing, in which Google states that 
“[w]e serve small text ads that are relevant to the messages in Gmail.” Id. ¶ 36. 
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  4. Disclosures to Cable One Users 
As discussed above, Cable One contracted with Google and agreed to ensure that its end 
users agreed to the Google Apps TOS, which are, in all respects relevant to the instant litigation, 
identical to the 2007 Gmail TOS discussed above, which contained the language about Google’s 
ability to pre-screen or review content for objectionable material. Id. ¶ 6. However, it is not clear 
from the record that Cable One’s end users ever received a copy or link to the Google Apps TOS or 
that Cable One end users were required to agree to the TOS to create their accounts. That TOS 
states that “[b]y using Google’s products, software, services, or web sites . . . , you agree to the 
following terms and conditions, and any policies, guidelines, or amendments thereto that may be 
presented to you from time to time, including but not limited to Program Policies and Legal 
Notices . . . .” Id., Ex. C. The TOS also incorporates by reference the Privacy Policy in effect at the 
time, by linking to Google’s Privacy Policy page, which contained the latest Privacy Policy. Id.  
During the initial email migration process to Google Apps, Cable One provided users a link 
to the current version of the Google Privacy Policy (which contained the language that Google 
could collect “user communications . . . to Google”) at the bottom of the Account Transfer page. 
Id., Ex. OO. After the migration to Google Apps, from 2010 to at least 2011, Cable One’s Self 
Support Portal page directed users interested in learning more about their email platform to Gmail 
Help pages. Id., Ex. PP. The Gmail Help pages contain links to Google’s Privacy Policy and TOS 
at the bottom of the page. Id. The Self Support Portal also provided a link to “Legal Notices” at the 
bottom of the pages, but it is unclear from the record where the “Legal Notices” link leads. Id.  
  5.  Educational Institutions’ Disclosures 
 As discussed above, the educational institutions with whom Google contracted were also 
required to obtain the necessary authorizations from end users for Google to provide its services. 
Id. ¶¶ 7-8. However, Google does not mandate how these educational institutions receive such 
authorizations, nor is that process uniform between various educational institutions. Id. ¶ 72. 
Accordingly, there are substantial differences between how each of the institutions approaches 
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disclosures. Moreover, it is unclear from the record what disclosures of the various universities 
each end user saw before registering for an account.  
 For example, for the University of the Pacific, the email sign-in page provides links to 
Google’s Privacy Policy and TOS at the bottom of the page, below the sign-in button. ECF No. 107 
(“Wong Decl.”) ¶ 86. The University of Hawaii has a link to a Google Help Center to the side of 
the sign-in page. This Help Center contains links to Google’s TOS and Privacy Policy. Id. ¶ 87. 
The Rochester Institute of Technology and Carnegie Mellon University direct users with questions 
regarding Google’s processing of email to Google’s Privacy Notices and Privacy Policies. Id. ¶ 89. 
As discussed above, the specific language of the TOS, Privacy Policies, and Privacy Notices have 
evolved over the last five years, but these universities provide links to the latest versions on 
Google’s website. Therefore, some end users may have followed links from the universities to the 
TOS that contained the statement about Google’s authority to pre-screen material to prevent 
objectionable content, while others may have viewed the Privacy Policies’ discussion that Google 
was authorized to collect user communications to Google.  
In contrast to the Google disclosures, some universities provide more detail to end users 
regarding the alleged interceptions at issue in the instant litigation. The University of California, 
Santa Cruz has a webpage titled “Security Information for Google Apps,” where the University 
provides links to Google’s TOS and Privacy Policies that were in effect at the time as discussed 
above. Id. ¶ 91. However, this webpage also contains a list of myths and facts about Gmail, one of 
which is particularly relevant here. Id., Ex. 82. The webpage states, “MYTH: Google accesses 
people’s email for marketing purposes” and “FACT: Google Apps for Education is ad-free for 
students, faculty, and staff. This means that your email is not processed by Google’s advertising 
systems.” Id. In contrast, the University of Alaska has a Google Mail FAQ page, which asks “I 
hear that Google reads my email. Is this true?” The answer states, “They do not ‘read’ your email 
per se. For use in targeted advertising on their other sites, and if your email is not encrypted, 
software (not a person) does scan your mail and compile keywords for advertising.” Id. ¶ 88. 
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Similarly, Western Piedmont Community College’s FAQ page states in response to the question 
“I’ve heard that Google scans the text in emails of Gmail accounts. Is that true?”: “Well, yes, but 
probably not in the way you might be thinking. Google does use software or a ‘bot’ to scan Gmail 
emails for key words for the purposes of targeted advertising. Google then places small, 
unobtrusive, and relevant text ads alongside your Gmail messages, similar to those on the side of 
Google search results pages. The matching of ads to content is a completely automated process 
performed by computers. No humans read your email to target the ads, and no email content or 
other personally identifiable information is ever provided to advertisers.” Id. ¶ 94. Stanford 
University’s FAQ page links to Google’s Privacy Policy and states that “[i]n order to provide 
essential core features for Stanford Alumni Email, Google runs completely automated scanning 
and indexing processes to offer spam filtering, anti-virus protection, and malware detection. Their 
systems also scan content to make sure Apps work better for users, enabling functionality like 
search in Gmail or Google Docs.” Id., Ex. 89. 
  6.  Publicity Regarding Operation of Gmail 
 Google also points to media reports that discuss Google’s scanning of emails as potential 
disclosures to which Class members may have been exposed. Id. ¶ 4. The news reports about 
Google’s scanning practices fall broadly into four categories.  
 First, there was extensive media reporting of Gmail’s launch in 2004. Id. ¶¶ 12-26. Several 
of the articles noted that Google automatically scanned all emails for the purposes of providing 
targeted advertising related to the content of emails. Id. For example, a USA Today article from 
2004 states that “Google’s computers automatically scan the body of messages for keywords used 
to tailor ads and match other information in its vast database.” Id., Ex. 4. A New York Times 
column stated that Google “said that its software would place ads in your incoming messages, 
relevant to their contents.” Id., Ex. 7. An article in the Chicago Tribune stated that “Google uses its 
AdSense software to read every word in every e-mail, and it then serves up related ads in the right 
margin.” Id., Ex. 11. Finally, a San Jose Mercury News article stated that “[t]he most controversial 
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aspect of the [Gmail] service will likely be the small text ads that Google will automatically place 
in every e-mail message. Powered by the company’s AdSense program, the ads will be contextual, 
meaning they will relate to keywords in the e-mail.” Wong Decl., Ex. 15. 
 Second, there was continued discussion in the media between 2005 and 2010 regarding 
Google’s scanning practices. Id. ¶ 35. For example, a 2007 New York Times story about an 
unrelated online phone start-up, leads with “[c]ompanies like Google scan their e-mail users’ in-
boxes to deliver ads related to those messages. Will people be as willing to let a company listen in 
on their phone conversations to do the same?” Id., Ex. 30. Similarly, a 2008 NPR story reported 
that “four years ago, when Google launched its ad-based Gmail, a lot of people were concerned 
that Google would be scanning private email to sell targeted ads. Today, most people don’t seem to 
mind so much and continue to use it.” Id., Ex. 34. A 2008 Washington Post article notes that 
“[m]illions of people subject themselves to . . . intensive scrutiny when they use Google’s Gmail 
service, which scans the text of each message to place more relevant ads.” Id., Ex. 35. 
 Third, there was news coverage of Google’s 2011 roll out of a new advertising system, 
which allowed Google not only to present advertisements targeted to individual emails, but rather 
allowed Google to present advertisements tailored to information about users that Google 
aggregates over time. Id. ¶ 50. NBC News reported, for example, that “[w]hat if your email service 
gradually learned from the emails you send and read so that it could show you ads which you might 
actually be interested in? That’s exactly what Google will be doing soon.” Id., Ex. 46. Similarly, 
PC World reported that “[f]or years, Gmail has been reading users’ e-mails to display relevant ads, 
but soon it’ll go a step further by learning users’ habits.” Id., Ex. 47. A New York Times column 
also reported on this shift, stating that “[l]ast month, Google also announced that it was trying to 
make its ads even more ‘useful and relevant’ by scanning for ‘importance signals’ and recurring 
topics within messages to better serve up appropriate advertising.”5 Id., Ex. 50. 
                                                          
5 Google also cites publicity surrounding its 2012 consolidation of various Privacy Policies 
discussed above. Wong Decl. ¶ 60. However, coverage of this consolidation related principally to 
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 Fourth, there has been media coverage of the instant litigation and related litigation. Id. ¶ 
70. For example, an Associated Press article states that “[a] Pennsylvania woman has accused 
Google Inc. of illegal wiretapping for ‘intercepting’ emails she sent to Gmail accounts and 
publishing content-related ads. Her lawsuit echoes others filed around the country by class-action 
lawyers who say the practice violates wiretap laws in some states.” Id., Ex. 64. A CBS News article 
also reported on the instant litigation, stating that “[f]or years, Google’s computers have scanned 
the content of millions of Gmails—Google’s popular email service—in order to figure out what ads 
the user might respond to.”6 Id., Ex. 67. 
 B. Procedural History 
  1.  Dunbar  
 The first case that makes up this multi-district litigation, Dunbar v. Google, was filed on 
November 17, 2010, in the Eastern District of Texas. See Dunbar v. Google, Inc. (“Dunbar I”), 
No. 10-CV-194, ECF No. 1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2010). After full briefing, on May 23, 2011, Judge 
Folsom denied in full Google’s motion to dismiss Dunbar’s complaint. See Dunbar I, ECF No. 61 
(E.D. Tex. May 23, 2011). After the order on the motion to dismiss, the parties exchanged 
substantial discovery. See Dunbar I, ECF No. 87 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2011). 
 Dunbar then filed a motion for class certification. After full briefing and a hearing on 
December 8, 2011, Judge Folsom denied Plaintiffs’ class certification motion without prejudice on 
March 16, 2012. See Dunbar I, ECF No. 156 (E.D. Tex. March 16, 2012). In the order denying 
class certification, Judge Folsom found that Dunbar had, on balance, satisfied the requirements of 
Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of class representative and class 
counsel. Id. at 10-16. However, Judge Folsom found that Dunbar’s proposed class, of all non-
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Google’s sharing of information across services rather than to the scanning of emails. For example, 
a Wall Street Journal article states that “[t]he big difference here is that Google has previously not 
combined information from so many different services, instead of keeping some of it in ‘silos’ that 
were originally intended in part to preserve users’ anonymity.” Id., Ex. 53. 
6 Google also cites an advertising campaign by Microsoft, which criticizes Google’s record on 
privacy. Wong Decl. ¶¶ 64-69.  
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Gmail users who had sent emails from their non-“@gmail.com” accounts to a Gmail or Cable One 
account, was not ascertainable, because the proposed class excluded “individuals . . . who seek 
actual damages and profits from Google.” Id. at 4. Judge Folsom found that this exclusion was not 
objective, and that accordingly, the class was not ascertainable. Id. at 9. Furthermore, Judge 
Folsom found that Dunbar’s class definition was deficient because users with non-“@gmail.com” 
accounts necessarily included Google Apps users. Id. Judge Folsom also found that Dunbar had not 
satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement because Dunbar had not presented an adequate 
trial plan. Id. at 16-20. Finally, Judge Folsom found that Dunbar had not satisfied the 
predominance requirement because there would be potential individualized questions of consent 
under Dunbar’s proposed trial plan. Id. at 21-22.  
 On April 20, 2012, one month after Judge Folsom’s class certification denial, Google filed 
another motion to dismiss, seeking dismissal on venue grounds. See Dunbar I, ECF No. 160 (E.D. 
Tex. April 20, 2012). In the alternative, Google requested that the case be transferred to the 
Northern District of California. See id. The motion to transfer was granted, and the case was 
transferred to this Court and assigned to the undersigned judge on June 27, 2012. See Dunbar v. 
Google, Inc. (“Dunbar II”), No. 12-3305, ECF No. 180 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2012). 
 On August 28, 2012, Dunbar moved for leave to amend the complaint and indicated his 
intent to file a renewed class certification motion. See Dunbar II, ECF No. 205 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 
2012). After full briefing and a hearing, this Court granted the motion for leave to amend on 
December 12, 2012. See Dunbar II, ECF No. 226 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2012). The Court found that 
Dunbar had been diligent since Judge Folsom’s denial of the initial class certification motion, and 
that Google would not be unduly prejudiced by amendment because the Court would not reopen 
class discovery, which had closed on October 25, 2011. Id. at 17-25. Moreover, in the order on 
Dunbar’s motion for leave to amend, the Court extensively addressed Google’s contention that 
amendment would be futile because the amended complaint could not remedy the defects that 
Judge Folsom identified in his class certification order. Id. at 25-30. Specifically, the Court noted 
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that the new class definition in the complaint did not exclude those who sought damages from 
Google and that the new class definition focused on Cable One users rather than users with non-
“@gmail.com” addresses, which would encompass Google Apps users. Id. at 26-27. Moreover, the 
Court noted that while predominance and superiority concerns may preclude class certification, 
leave to amend should be granted because Judge Folsom’s denial of class certification was 
explicitly without prejudice, suggesting that amendment and more evidence could cure the 
deficiencies identified in Judge Folsom’s class certification order. Id. at 28-30. After this Court 
granted leave, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint, which Google answered. See Dunbar II, 
ECF No. 228 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2013); Dunbar II, ECF No. 246 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013). 
On January 8, 2013, this Court set a briefing schedule for Dunbar’s renewed class 
certification motion. See Dunbar II, ECF No. 242 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013). Pursuant to this 
schedule, on January 28, 2013, Dunbar filed a renewed class certification motion. See Dunbar II, 
ECF No. 249 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013). In the motion, Dunbar sought to certify a class of Cable 
One users who used their Cable One Google Apps email account to send a message to a Gmail user 
or receive a message in the two years before the filing of Dunbar up until class certification. Id. at 
6. On March 7, 2013, Google filed an opposition, contending that Dunbar could not show 
predominance because individual issues of whether interceptions had taken place and individual 
issues of consent would predominate over any common issues, that Dunbar was an inadequate 
class representative, and that adjudication by class would not be superior to individualized 
adjudications. See Dunbar II, ECF No. 261 (N.D. Cal. March 7, 2013). Dunbar filed his reply brief 
on March 28, 2013, contending that both express and implied consent could be litigated on a class-
wide basis, that Dunbar is an adequate class representative, and that class adjudication would be 
superior to individual actions. See Dunbar II, ECF No. 269 (N.D. Cal. March 28, 2013). 
  2.  Other Cases and Consolidation 
While Dunbar was pending, five other actions involving substantially similar allegations 
against Google were filed in this District and throughout the country. See Scott, et al. v. Google, 
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Inc., No. 12-3413 (N.D. Cal.); Scott v. Google, Inc., No. 12-614 (N.D. Fla.); A.K. v. Google, Inc., 
No. 12-1179 (S.D. Ill.); Knowles v. Google, Inc., No. 12-2022 (D. Md.); Brinkman v. Google, Inc., 
No. 12-6699 (E.D. Pa.). On April 1, 2013, before the Court could rule on Dunbar’s class 
certification motion, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued a Transfer Order, 
centralizing Dunbar along with the five other actions in the Northern District of California before 
the undersigned judge. See ECF No. 1. At an initial case management conference on April 18, 
2013, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file a consolidated complaint on May 16, 2013, set the 
briefing schedule for any motion to dismiss, and scheduled a hearing for September 5, 2013. See 
ECF No. 9. The Court also set a class certification briefing schedule and a class certification 
hearing for January 16, 2014.7 See id. On May 6, 2013, this Court related a seventh action, Fread v. 
Google, Inc., No. 13-1961 (N.D. Cal.), as part of this multi-district litigation. See ECF No. 29. 
  3. Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Certify 
In line with the Court’s scheduling order, Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Complaint on May 
16, 2013. See ECF No. 38. That complaint attempted to state causes of action under (1) ECPA; (2) 
CIPA; (3) Maryland’s Wiretap Act; (4) Florida’s Wiretap Act; and (5) Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping 
and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5701 (2012). Google filed a Motion 
to Dismiss the Consolidated Complaint on June 13, 2013. See ECF No. 44. After full briefing, this 
Court held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on September 5, 2013. See ECF No. 64. 
The Court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Motion to Dismiss on 
September 26, 2013. See ECF No. 69. The Court granted Google’s Motion with respect to 
Plaintiffs’ claims under section 632 of the California Penal Code, finding that emails were not 
“confidential” under that part of CIPA. Id. at 40-42. The Court further found that Pennsylvania law 
did not confer anti-wiretapping protections on recipients of emails and therefore granted Google’s 
Motion with respect to the Pennsylvania law claims of non-Gmail users who merely received 
                                                          
7 The hearing was continued to February 27, 2014. See ECF No. 127. 
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emails from Gmail users. Id. at 42-43. The Court denied the rest of the Motion to Dismiss, 
rejecting Google’s two principal bases for dismissal. First, the Court rejected Google’s contention 
that any interceptions in the instant case fell within the “ordinary course” of Google’s business and 
were therefore exempt from anti-wiretapping statutes. Utilizing the tools of statutory interpretation, 
the Court concluded that the ordinary course of business exception was intended only to protect 
electronic communication service providers from liability where the interceptions helped facilitate 
or were instrumental to the provision of the electronic communication service. Id. at 19-20 (“In 
light of the statutory text, case law, statutory scheme, and legislative history concerning the 
ordinary course of business exception, the Court finds that the [‘ordinary course of business’] 
exception is narrow and designed only to protect electronic communication service providers 
against a finding of liability under the Wiretap Act where the interception facilitated or was 
incidental to provision of the electronic communication service at issue.”). The Court further found 
that interceptions that violate an electronic communication service provider’s internal policies, as 
was alleged in the instant case, could not be within the provider’s ordinary course of business. Id. 
at 20-22. Second, the Court rejected Google’s argument that all Gmail users had consented to the 
alleged interceptions based on the TOS and Privacy Policy. The Court concluded that the TOS and 
Privacy Policy did not provide sufficient disclosures to conclude that Gmail users had consented to 
the alleged interceptions. Id. at 22-26. The Court further rejected Google’s contention that all email 
users, regardless of whether they had viewed any disclosures, had impliedly consented to the 
alleged interceptions, because all email users, including non-Gmail users, understand that such 
interceptions are part of how emails are transmitted. Id. at 27-28. The Court further held that 
Plaintiffs could proceed on their claims under section 631 of CIPA. Id. at 28-40.  
 On October 9, 2013, Google filed a Motion for § 1292(b) Certification for Interlocutory 
Review of this Court’s September 26, 2013 Order on the Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 80. 
Plaintiffs opposed that motion on October 16, 2013. See ECF No. 83. This Court held a hearing on 
the Section 1292(b) Certification Motion on October 29, 2013. See ECF No. 94. On January 27, 
Case5:13-md-02430-LHK   Document158   Filed03/18/14   Page18 of 41
Case5:13-md-02430-LHK   Document158   Filed03/18/14   Page19 of 41
 
 
 
20 
Case No.:  13-MD-02430-LHK 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
Gmail accounts to send an email to a minor Gmail 
user or to receive an email from a non-Gmail user 
or a minor Gmail user. (“Minor Class”) 
friend to 
minor J.K.  
action to the date 
of certification. 
All U.S. resident non-Gmail users who have used 
their non-Gmail accounts to receive an email from 
an “@gmail.com” address or to send an email 
message to an “@gmail.com” email address. 
(“Non-Gmail Wiretap Act Class”) 
Kovler, 
Harrington, 
Brad Scott 
Longest period 
allowed by statute 
of limitations to 
the date of 
certification.  
Federal 
Wiretap Act 
Subclass of Non-Gmail Wiretap Act Class: All 
U.S. residents, except California residents, who 
have used their non-Gmail accounts to send an 
email message to an “@gmail.com” email address. 
(“Non-Gmail CIPA Subclass”) 
Kovler, 
Harrington, 
Brad Scott 
Longest period 
allowed by statute 
of limitations to 
the date of 
certification. 
CIPA 
Subclass of Non-Gmail Wiretap Act Class: All 
Florida residents who have used their non-Gmail 
accounts to send an email message to an 
“@gmail.com” email address. (“Non-Gmail 
Florida Subclass”)  
Brent Scott Longest period 
allowed by statute 
of limitations to 
the date of 
certification. 
Florida 
Statute §§ 
934.03, et 
seq. 
Subclass of Non-Gmail Wiretap Act Class: All 
Maryland residents who have used their non-
Gmail accounts to send an email message to an 
“@gmail.com” email address. (“Non-Gmail 
Maryland Subclass”) 
Knowles Longest period 
allowed by statute 
of limitations to 
the date of 
certification. 
Maryland 
Cts. and 
Judicial 
Proceedings 
Code §§ 10-
402, et seq. 
See Mot. at 9-10; Reply at 6 n.18; ECF No. 115. Excluded from all classes are all state, local, and 
federal government entities; individuals who timely opt out; current or former Google employees; 
individuals who have previously settled the claims identified in the FACC; and any currently 
sitting federal judge and people within three degrees of consanguinity to any federal judge. FACC 
¶ 352. Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification on November 
21, 2013. See Opp. Plaintiffs filed a Reply in support of their Motion on December 19, 2013. See 
Reply.8 The Court held a hearing on February 27, 2014. See Tr.  
                                                          
8 After the close of briefing, the parties filed motions to supplement the record. On February 6, 
2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record, which Google opposed. ECF 
Nos. 130-2, 134. Plaintiffs seek to introduce emails regarding the interceptions between named 
Plaintiff Fread and Google. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion on the basis that the emails go to 
Fread’s individual concerns about the use of Google Apps services by the University of Hawaii and 
thus are not relevant to any issues of class certification. On February 25, 2014, Google filed a 
Motion to Supplement the Record with additional excerpts of a deposition of Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. 
Matthew Green, who submitted a declaration in conjunction with the Reply in support of the 
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II. LEGAL STANDARD 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class certification, has two sets of 
distinct requirements that Plaintiffs must meet before the Court may certify a class. Plaintiffs must 
meet all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and must satisfy at least one of the prongs of Rule 23(b). 
 Under Rule 23(a), the Court may certify a class only where “(1) the class is so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Courts refer to these four requirements, which must be satisfied to 
maintain a class action, as “numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation.” 
Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, courts have implied an 
additional requirement under Rule 23(a): that the class to be certified be ascertainable. See Marcus 
v. BMW of North America, LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-93 (3d Cir. 2012); Herrera v. LCS Fin. Servs. 
Corp., 274 F.R.D. 666, 671-72 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  
 In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), the Court must also find that 
Plaintiffs have satisfied “through evidentiary proof” one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013). The Court can certify a Rule 23(b)(1) 
class when Plaintiffs make a showing that there would be a risk of substantial prejudice or 
inconsistent adjudications if there were separate adjudications. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). The Court 
can certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
instant Motion. See ECF No. 141. The Court GRANTED this motion, which Plaintiffs do not 
oppose, at the hearing. Tr. 7:20. Google also moved to file a Statement of Recent Decision 
regarding the Marin County Superior Court’s decision in Diamond v. Google, which Plaintiffs have 
opposed. See ECF Nos. 141-42. The Court DENIES Google’s motion because the reasoned 
tentative decision of the Marin County Superior Court was superseded by a two-sentence order on 
the motion that stated only that the Court’s rationale was placed on the record. On March 18, 2014, 
Plaintiffs filed another Motion to Supplement the Record. See ECF No. 156-2. The Court 
GRANTS this Motion because the material contained therein relates to the uniformity in Google’s 
processing of emails, which is relevant to class certification.   
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grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Finally, the Court 
can certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class if the Court finds that “questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 “[A] court’s class-certification analysis must be ‘rigorous’ and may ‘entail some overlap 
with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.’” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust 
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194 (2013) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 
2551 (2011)); see also Mazza, 666 F.3d at 588 (“‘Before certifying a class, the trial court must 
conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’ to determine whether the party seeking certification has met the 
prerequisites of Rule 23.’” (quoting Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186, 
amended by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001)). Nevertheless, “Rule 23 grants courts no license to 
engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.” Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1194-95.  
“Merits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant 
to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Id. at 1195. 
Within the framework of Rule 23, the Court ultimately has broad discretion over whether to certify 
a class. Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186.  
III. DISCUSSION 
 Plaintiffs move to certify all four Classes and three Subclasses identified above as Rule 
23(b)(3) damages classes. Google does not challenge Plaintiffs’ position that the putative Classes 
meet the numerosity and commonality requirements. Instead, Google contends that none of the 
Classes satisfies the ascertainability, predominance, and superiority requirements. Google also 
challenges some of the Classes under choice of law principles and contends that some Classes 
cannot meet the adequacy and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). The Court finds that none of 
the Classes can satisfy the predominance requirement. Accordingly, the Court does not reach 
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Google’s remaining contentions. The Court begins by setting forth the legal standard for 
predominance and then applies that standard to the four Classes and three Subclasses. After doing 
so, the Court concludes that individual issues regarding whether members of the various Classes 
consented to the alleged interceptions will predominate over common issues. 
 A.  Legal Standard for Predominance 
 The predominance inquiry of Rule 23(b)(3) “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently 
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 623 (1997). Accordingly, the predominance analysis “focuses on the relationship between the 
common and individual issues in the case.” Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 545 
(9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Wells Fargo Home Mortgage 
Overtime Pay Litig., 571 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Whether judicial economy will be served 
in a particular case turns on close scrutiny of the relationship between the common and individual 
issues.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 Undertaking the predominance analysis requires some inquiry into the merits, as the Court 
must consider “how a trial on the merits would be conducted if a class were certified.” Gene And 
Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1190 
(noting that district courts must consider as part of the predominance analysis whether a 
manageable class adjudication can be conducted). Though the Court needs to consider the merits to 
determine whether the action can be litigated on a class-wide basis, the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that class certification is not an opportunity for the Court to undertake plenary merits 
inquiries. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[m]erits questions may be considered to the extent—
but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for 
class certification are satisfied.” Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1195; see also In re Whirlpool Corp. 
Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 851 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that merits 
inquiries at the class certification stage are limited to those necessary to resolving the question 
presented by Rule 23).  
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The Court’s predominance analysis “entails identifying the substantive issues that will 
control the outcome, assessing which issues will predominate, and then determining whether the 
issues are common to the class, a process that ultimately prevents the class from degenerating into 
a series of individual trials.” Gene And Gene LLC, 541 F.3d at 326; see also In re New Motor 
Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Under the predominance 
inquiry, a district court must formulate some prediction as to how specific issues will play out in 
order to determine whether common or individual issues predominate in a given case.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding 
predominance “[w]hen common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they can be 
resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication”). To meet the predominance 
requirement, “common questions must be a significant aspect of the case that can be resolved for 
all members of the class in a single adjudication.” Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 
1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  
Importantly, the predominance inquiry is a pragmatic one, in which the Court does more 
than just count up common issues and individual issues. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 1778 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that “the proper standard under Rule 23(b)(3) is a 
pragmatic one, which is in keeping with the basic objectives of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action”). As 
the Seventh Circuit recently stated, “predominance requires a qualitative assessment too; it is not 
bean counting.” Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court’s 
inquiry is not whether common questions predominate with respect to individual elements or 
affirmative defenses; rather, the inquiry is a holistic one, in which the Court considers whether 
overall, considering the issues to be litigated, common issues will predominate. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1196.  
 B. Application of the Predominance Standard 
 The Court now applies these standards to the four Classes and three Subclasses. The Court 
begins by describing the underlying merits inquiry before turning to the question of how best to 
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conduct such an inquiry. Id. at 1191 (“[T]he office of a Rule 23(b)(3) certification ruling is not to 
adjudicate the case; rather, it is to select the ‘metho[d]’ best suited to adjudication of the 
controversy ‘fairly and efficiently.’” (internal alterations omitted)).  
The Wiretap Act, as amended by the ECPA, prohibits the interception of “wire, oral, or 
electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1); Joffe v. Google, Inc., No. 11-17483, 2013 WL 
6905957, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2013). More specifically, the Wiretap Act provides a private right 
of action against any person who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any 
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication.” 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); see id. § 2520 (providing a private right of action for violations of § 2511). 
The Wiretap Act contains several exemptions that render interceptions lawful. See 18 U.S.C. § 
2511(2)(a)-(h). Among these exemptions is an exemption for consent: 
 
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law 
to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party 
to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given 
prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the 
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or 
laws of the United States or of any State. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). The state anti-wiretapping statutes at issue in the instant litigation contain 
consent exceptions that are similar but require all parties to the intercepted communication to have 
consented. See Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(d); Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402(c)(3); 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 5704(4).9 
 The question of whether Class members have consented to the alleged interceptions has 
been central to this case since its inception. Specifically, the issue of whether email users consented 
to the alleged interceptions was at issue in all rounds of briefing on motions to dismiss, all three 
rounds of briefing on class certification, and the briefing on the motion for leave to amend. See 
                                                          
9 The distinction between one-party consent and two-party consent is immaterial to the Court’s 
analysis, because as discussed below, the issue of whether any email user (Gmail user, Google 
Apps end user, or non-Gmail user) consented to the alleged interceptions is a question fraught with 
individualized inquiries.  
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Dunbar I, ECF No. 13 (E.D. Tex Feb. 4, 2011); Dunbar I, ECF No. 23 (E.D. Tex. March 10, 
2011); Dunbar I, ECF No. 61; Dunbar I, ECF No. 119 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2011); Dunbar II, ECF 
No. 210-3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012); Dunbar II, ECF No. 261; ECF No. 44 at 13-21; Opp. at 11-
18. The consent exception remains one of the principal disputed issues in this case. In fact, both 
sides in discussing predominance in their briefing on the instant Motion focus heavily on the 
consent exception.10 For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that individual issues of consent 
are likely to predominate over any common issues, and that accordingly, class certification would 
be inappropriate.  
 The Court begins by briefly describing the consent exemption. Courts have interpreted the 
consent exemption to encompass two different forms of consent. First, consent can be express. 
United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996). Second, in the alternative, consent 
can be implied in fact based on whether the surrounding circumstances demonstrate that the party 
whose communications were intercepted knew of such interceptions. Id. Regardless, consent must 
be actual, and not constructive. In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Consent 
may be explicit or implied, but it must be actual consent rather than constructive consent.”). 
Importantly, under the Wiretap Act, the statute pursuant to which the Cable One Class, Education 
Class, Minor Class, and Non-Gmail Wiretap Act Class bring claims, only one party to the 
intercepted communication needs to consent to render the interception lawful. 18 U.S.C. § 
                                                          
10 In the briefs, the parties dispute whether the question of whether emails were intercepted 
pursuant to the Wiretap Act is a common question or an individual question. See Mot. at 18-20; 
Opp. at 18-22; Reply at 6-9. Plaintiffs contend that Google uniformly intercepts emails for COB 
processing. Google notes that there are a number of situations in which emails are not subject to 
COB processing. Opp. at 18-19. Only one of these situations—Google claims that Google Apps 
Administrators can configure their systems to avoid COB processing—would lead to 
individualized inquiries. Google relies exclusively on a declaration from a Google engineer for 
Google’s claim that Google Apps Administrators can avoid COB processing. See ECF No. 106 
(“Long Decl.”) ¶ 3. Plaintiffs contend that this declaration contradicts the engineer’s previous 
deposition and Google’s recent representations to the media, and that therefore the declaration is a 
sham. Green Reply Decl. ¶ 10; ECF No. 156-2. The Court need not decide the question of whether 
the declaration is valid and therefore whether the question of interceptions is a class-wide question, 
because the Court finds that even if this question were a class-wide question, that common 
questions would be overwhelmed by individualized questions of consent as discussed below.  
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2511(2)(d). Therefore, the ultimate merits inquiry requires not only consideration of whether the 
Class members consented, but also whether their correspondents consented.11 However, for the 
three state statutes at issue with respect to the three Subclasses, the merits inquiry requires both 
parties to consent. Accordingly, if either party to a communication did not consent, that would end 
the inquiry. 
In the instant litigation, Google has marshaled both express and implied theories of consent. 
Accordingly, the Court turns to each of the two theories of consent and describes the legal standard 
that must be applied with respect to each, the Court’s rulings regarding the two theories of consent 
at the Motion to Dismiss stage, and the evidence in the record that the parties will marshal going 
forward to prove the existence or absence of consent. The Court concludes, for the reasons stated 
below, that this evidence suggests that consent must be litigated on an individual, rather than class-
wide basis. The Court will conclude by addressing Plaintiffs’ contentions to the contrary.  
  1.  Express Consent 
Courts have consistently noted that individuals may expressly consent to the interception of 
their communications. Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 19; Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 292; United States v. 
Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987). However, detailed discussion of the express consent 
exception to the Wiretap Act in the case law is relatively scant. Nevertheless, at the Motion to 
Dismiss stage, Google contended that Gmail users and all Google Apps end users had expressly 
consented to Google’s alleged interceptions. For this proposition, Google relied on the various 
                                                          
11 The Court does not separately discuss Minor Class members’ consent for four reasons. First, the 
parties have cited no case law suggesting that minors cannot provide consent to interceptions of 
their communications under the Wiretap Act. Second, Plaintiffs rely exclusively on a California 
statute, Cal. Fam. Code § 6701, to contend that minors cannot consent. However, this provision 
relates to contract law. As discussed below, consent for purposes of contract law is distinct from 
consent for purposes of the Wiretap Act. Third, even if state contract law consent principles were 
to negate a minor’s ability to consent under the Wiretap Act, there would be individual questions as 
to where the minor email senders and recipients reside and which state laws should apply. The 
nationwide Minor Class would therefore require several individual inquiries even under Plaintiffs’ 
theory. Fourth, to the extent that minors have corresponded with adults, there would be several 
individualized issues regarding the adult correspondent’s consent, as discussed below.  
Case5:13-md-02430-LHK   Document158   Filed03/18/14   Page27 of 41
 
 
 
28 
Case No.:  13-MD-02430-LHK 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
TOS and Privacy Policies that were in effect between 2008 and 2013. In the Order on the Motion 
to Dismiss, this Court rejected Google’s contentions. The Court held that the TOS and Privacy 
Policies did not provide sufficient disclosures regarding the alleged interceptions—the scanning of 
emails for the purposes of providing targeted advertising and creation of user profiles—to warrant 
dismissal under the express consent exception to the Wiretap Act. ECF No. 69 at 24-26. 
Specifically, the Court found that Google’s reliance on the language of its TOS, which stated that 
“Google reserves the right (but shall have no obligation) to pre-screen, review, flag, filter, modify, 
refuse or remove any or all Content from any Service,” was misplaced because that provision 
related to Google’s participation in the email delivery process to preclude objectionable content, 
particularly in light of the sentence that followed, which stated that “[f]or some of the Services, 
Google may provide tools to filter out explicit sexual content.” Id. at 24. 
Similarly, the Court was not persuaded that the Privacy Policies, which stated that Google 
collected “[i]nformation you provide, [c]ookies[,] [l]og information[,] [u]ser communications . . . 
to Google[,] [a]ffiliated sites, [l]inks[,] [and] [o]ther sites” and used such information for the 
purposes of “[p]roviding our services to users, including the display of customized content and 
advertising,” provided clear enough disclosures regarding Google’s interceptions of emails 
between users to provide targeted advertisements. Id. at 25. In fact, the Court found that certain 
statements in the Privacy Policies, which stated that Google would collect “user communications . . 
. to Google” could actively obscure Google’s interceptions. Id.at 25-26 (emphasis in original).  
At the instant stage of litigation, the Court must consider whether express consent is an 
issue that can be decided on a class-wide basis or whether individual issues will predominate. The 
Court notes that the question of express consent is usually a question of fact, where a fact-finder 
needs to interpret the express terms of any agreements to determine whether these agreements 
adequately notify individuals regarding the interceptions. See Murray v. Fin. Visions, Inc., No. 07-
2578, 2008 WL 4850328, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2008). 
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Plaintiffs contend that the question of express consent is a question particularly susceptible 
to class-wide adjudication, since all Gmail users were subject to the same disclosures. While the 
Court agrees that express consent may be a common question with respect to the Minor Class and 
the Cable One Class, the express consent of Education Class members is likely to require 
individualized inquiries. This is so because Google had no single policy that required all Google 
Apps Administrators to provide the same disclosures to end users. See Chin Decl. ¶ 3. This means 
that the end users received vastly different disclosures depending on with which educational 
institution they were affiliated. Some institutions’ disclosures are quite explicit. For example, 
Western Piedmont Community College tells its users that “Google does use software or a ‘bot’ to 
scan Gmail emails for key words for the purposes of targeted advertising.” Wong Decl., Ex. 85. 
Similarly, the University of Alaska states that “For use in targeted advertising on [Google’s] other 
sites, and if your email is not encrypted, software (not a person) does scan your mail and compile 
keywords for advertising.” Id., Ex. 79. Meanwhile, other universities, such as the University of the 
Pacific, merely incorporate Google’s disclosures by citing to the TOS and Privacy Policies. Id., Ex. 
74. As discussed above, it is not clear that end users even had to look at these disclosures before 
they could create their accounts. Further, even if the users had seen these disclosures, as this Court 
noted above and in its Order on the Motion to Dismiss, Google’s disclosures were vague at best, 
and misleading, at worst. For example, the TOS stated only that Google retained authority to pre-
screen content to prevent objectionable material, while the Privacy Policies suggested only that 
Google would collect user communications to Google. Accordingly, the diversity of disclosures 
made by educational institutions, ranging from specific disclosures about the method and reasons 
for interceptions to the incorporation of vague disclosures, may well lead a fact-finder to conclude 
that end users at some universities consented, while end users at other universities did not. As such, 
the Court finds that there are substantial individualized inquiries on the issue of express consent. 
In sum, the Court finds that with respect to the Education Class, the substantial individual 
questions regarding the nature of each Google Apps Administrator’s disclosures are likely to lead 
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to individual questions regarding express consent that will predominate over common questions. 
The Court need not determine whether class-wide express consent questions will predominate over 
individual questions with respect to the Minor Class, Cable One Class, and the Non-Gmail User 
Classes because, as discussed below, the Court finds that individualized questions regarding 
implied consent will overwhelm any common issues regarding these Classes.  
  2. Implied Consent 
 The Court now turns to implied consent. Implied consent is an intensely factual question 
that requires consideration of the circumstances surrounding the interception to divine whether the 
party whose communication was intercepted was on notice that the communication would be 
intercepted. Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 582 (11th Cir. 1983) (“It is the task of the 
trier of fact to determine the scope of the consent and to decide whether and to what extent the 
interception exceeded that consent.”); see also Murray, 2008 WL 4850328, at *4 (“The question of 
consent, either express or implied, is often a fact-intensive inquiry and may vary with the 
circumstances of the parties.”). As the D.C. Circuit has concluded, “[w]ithout actual notice, 
consent can only be implied when the surrounding circumstances convincingly show that the party 
knew about and consented to the interception.” Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted; emphasis added); Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 
292 (“Consent may be express or may be implied in fact from surrounding circumstances 
indicating that the defendant knowingly agreed to the surveillance.” (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted; emphasis added)). “[I]mplied consent is consent in fact which is inferred from 
surrounding circumstances indicating that the party knowingly agreed to the surveillance.” Griggs-
Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116-17 (1st Cir. 1990) (internal alterations and quotation marks 
omitted).  
 Applying this standard to the Motion to Dismiss, which examines only the four corners of 
the complaint, the Court rejected Google’s contention that the Court should conclude that all email 
users impliedly consented to Google’s interceptions on the basis of the Complaint alone, because 
Case5:13-md-02430-LHK   Document158   Filed03/18/14   Page30 of 41
 
 
 
31 
Case No.:  13-MD-02430-LHK 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
all email users understand that such interceptions are part and parcel of the email delivery process. 
ECF No. 69 at 27. The Court found that there was no authority to support Google’s “far-reaching 
proposition” that consent could be implied so broadly as a matter of law without any factual 
development. Id. The Court therefore concluded that accepting Google’s theory of implied consent 
“would eviscerate the rule against interception” since under Google’s theory, consent could easily 
be implied as a matter of law with respect to large swaths of electronic communication services. Id.  
 Now, at the class certification stage, the Court must consider what evidence Google can use 
to argue to the finder of fact that email users have impliedly consented to these interceptions. 
Google contends that a broad swath of evidence that email users were notified of the interceptions, 
such as Google disclosures, third-party disclosures, and news articles, are relevant to the factual 
question of implied consent. Plaintiffs contend that only Google’s own disclosures to its users are 
relevant to the question of implied consent.  
The Court agrees with Google. As discussed above, courts have consistently held that 
implied consent is a question of fact that requires looking at all of the circumstances surrounding 
the interceptions to determine whether an individual knew that her communications were being 
intercepted. For example, the First Circuit has suggested that whether a party has impliedly 
consented is a factual question that requires a close examination of all the circumstances:  
 
The circumstances relevant to an implication of consent will vary from case to case, 
but the compendium will ordinarily include language or acts which tend to prove (or 
disprove) that a party knows of, or assents to, encroachments on the routine 
expectation that conversations are private. And the ultimate determination must 
proceed in light of the prophylactic purpose of [the Wiretap Act]—a purpose which 
suggests that consent should not casually be inferred. 
Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 117. Accordingly, “consent can be limited based upon the ‘subtleties and 
permutations inherent in a particular set of facts.’” Shefts v. Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620, 631 
(C.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 119). 
 Amen is instructive. There, the Second Circuit found that the consent exception to the 
Wiretap Act applied in the context of inmates whose phone calls were recorded. Amen, 831 F.2d at 
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378-79. The Second Circuit found that consent could be implied, because the inmates were on 
notice from several sources that their phone calls were being recorded. Id. at 379. The Second 
Circuit found implied consent based on the following: (1) the taping system was discussed at 
inmates’ orientation; (2) inmates received a handbook that discusses the interceptions; (3) there 
were notices near the phone alerting inmates of the monitoring; and (4) one of the inmate’s case 
managers presented the inmate with a form containing a written notice of disclosures, which the 
inmate refused to sign. Id. The Second Circuit’s reliance on a form that the inmate did not sign, but 
nevertheless saw, indicates that all materials to which an individual has notice are relevant to 
consent, not just contractual agreements. See Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 292 (approvingly citing Amen).  
The First Circuit’s decision in Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271 (1st Cir. 1993), is in accord. 
There, the First Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding, after a bench trial, that the CEO of a 
company had not consented to interceptions of his telephone calls by his employer. Id. at 281-82. 
The First Circuit noted that though the CEO was informed that the company had a system for 
randomly monitoring calls, it was not clear whether the CEO knew “(1) of the manner—i.e., the 
intercepting and recording of telephone conversations—in which this monitoring was conducted; 
and (2) that he himself would be subjected to such monitoring.” Id. at 281. The First Circuit 
concluded: 
 
There was testimony tending to indicate that [the CEO] was so informed, which the 
district judge apparently chose not to credit, and testimony tending to indicate that 
he was not. In our view, the latter testimony, far from being incredible, was highly 
plausible. Thus, there is no basis for us to conclude that the district court clearly 
erred in finding that [the CEO] was not told of the manner in which the monitoring 
was conducted and that he himself would be monitored. 
Id. at 281-82. The First Circuit, though ultimately rejecting the testimony, found that testimony 
about what the CEO knew was relevant to whether the CEO had consented. The First Circuit could 
have rejected the company’s contentions out of hand by requiring official or written notice. Rather, 
the First Circuit found that the question of implied consent was fundamentally a factual question on 
which all the testimony regarding what the CEO knew was relevant. In light of these authorities, 
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the Court concludes that while consent may only be implied in a narrow set of circumstances, a 
broad set of materials are relevant to determining whether such consent should be implied. 
 Applying these legal principles here, the Court finds that individual issues regarding 
consent are likely to overwhelmingly predominate over common issues. Specifically, there is a 
panoply of sources from which email users could have learned of Google’s interceptions other than 
Google’s TOS and Privacy Policies. First, Class members could have learned of the interceptions 
from various Google sources. For example, the “About Ads on Search, Gmail and across the web” 
page, which has been viewed more than a million times, states that “[t]he ads you see [in Gmail] 
may be based on many of the same factors as ads in Google Search as well as additional factors 
like the messages in your mailbox” and provides the following example: “You’ve recently received 
lots of messages about photography and cameras. In Gmail, you may see an ad with a deal from a 
local camera store.” Chin Decl. ¶¶ 41, 43; id., Ex. DD. Furthermore, the link for “Why This Ad?” 
next to each targeted advertisement in Gmail, which led users to the disclosure that “[t]his ad is 
based on emails from your inbox,” was clicked thousands of times in every day. Id. ¶ 56; id., Ex. 
JJ. Second, Class members may have learned about the alleged interceptions from various media 
sources.12 For example, a 2004 Houston Chronicle article states that “some industry watchers have 
complained that Google scans account holders’ messages for keywords and then delivers text-
based ads relevant to the keywords detected. However, most Gmail users said they’re not bothered 
by it.” Wong Decl., Ex. 13. Along a similar note, a Washington Post article stated, “Google’s 
Gmail service has generated some controversy among privacy activists for the way its technology 
serves up text ads to users based on the content of their messages. None of the Gmail account 
                                                          
12 Plaintiffs contend that these third-party documents are impermissible hearsay. See Reply at 5 
n.15. However, Google does not cite this material for the truth of the matter asserted therein—that 
is, to establish that Google actually intercepted emails. Rather, these documents are cited for the 
effect on the listener—that is, to show that Plaintiffs had knowledge that Google engaged in 
interceptions. United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1472 (9th Cir. 1991).  
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holders or would-be account holders contacted for this article expressed concerns along these 
lines.” Id., Ex. 9. 
Some Class members likely viewed some of these Google and non-Google disclosures, but 
others likely did not. A fact-finder, in determining whether Class members impliedly consented, 
would have to evaluate to which of the various sources each individual user had been exposed and 
whether each individual “knew about and consented to the interception” based on the sources to 
which she was exposed. See Berry, 146 F.3d at 1011. This fact-intensive inquiry will require 
individual inquiries into the knowledge of individual users. Such inquiries—determining to what 
disclosures each Class member was privy and determining whether that specific combination of 
disclosures was sufficient to imply consent—will lead to numerous individualized inquiries that 
will overwhelm any common questions. 
3.  Plaintiffs’ Contentions 
 Plaintiffs make three arguments in support of their claim that consent can be determined on 
a class-wide basis. First, Plaintiffs contend that in determining whether Gmail users impliedly 
consented, the finder of fact should be limited to looking at a uniform set of Google’s own 
disclosures, rather than to disclosures of third parties. Second, Plaintiffs contend that the parol 
evidence rule precludes the finder of fact from looking outside the contractual agreements between 
Gmail users and Google. Third, Plaintiffs contend that the specific disclosures to which Google 
points do not demonstrate consent, because those disclosures pre-date Google’s shift in email 
delivery processing from the CAT2 Mixer (which scanned emails only when the emails were 
opened) to COB (which scans all emails while the emails are in transit). In essence, Plaintiffs’ 
contention is that the third-party disclosures on which Google relies cannot disclose interceptions 
that did not exist at the time of the third-party disclosures.13 The Court does not find any of these 
contentions persuasive for the reasons stated below.  
                                                          
13 Plaintiffs also contend that consent can be negated on the basis that Google’s interceptions were 
for the “purpose of committing [a] . . . tortious act in violation of the . . . laws of the United States 
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 First, Plaintiffs contend that the factual inquiry with respect to implied consent should be 
limited to looking at the disclosures that Google itself made, rather than disclosures that third 
parties, such as news media, made. Even if Plaintiffs were correct regarding the scope of 
documents to which a fact-finder could look, there would be a myriad of individual issues with 
respect to consent, because Google itself had several disclosures, which could not have been 
uniformly viewed by Class members. For example, as discussed above, a Google page titled 
“About Ads on Search, Gmail and across the web” stated that “[t]he ads you see [in Gmail] may be 
based on many of the same factors as ads in Google Search as well as additional factors like the 
messages in your inbox,” and provided the following example: “You’ve recently received lots of 
messages about photography and cameras. In Gmail, you may see an ad with a deal from a local 
camera store.” Chin Decl. ¶ 43, id., Ex. DD. It is undisputed that this page has been viewed more 
than 1.6 million times since July 2012. Id. A finder of fact could conclude that Class members who 
viewed this particular disclosure were on notice of the alleged interceptions. Similarly, some Class 
members may have been part of the 100,000 individuals who clicked the “Why This Ad?” link next 
to a content-based advertisement in a single day. Id.¶ 58. Those users would have received a notice 
that “[t]his ad is based on emails from your inbox,” which again, a fact-finder could find sufficient 
to imply consent. Id., Ex. JJ. In light Google’s own disclosures’ diversity, even accepting 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
or any State,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d), and that this is a class-wide question. Mot. at 23-24. Google 
responds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege or provide any evidence that Google acted with the 
wrongful intent necessary to fall within the tort or crime exception to the consent exception. Opp. 
at 17. The Court agrees with Google. Alleged interceptions fall within the tort or crime exception 
only where the “primary motivation or a determining factor in [the interceptor’s] actions has been 
to injure plaintiffs tortiously.” In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 518 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nothing in the FACC, the briefing on the 
instant Motion, or the record suggests that this is Google’s motivation here. Moreover, as the 
DoubleClick Court found in a different context, the tort or crime exception cannot apply where the 
interceptor’s “purpose has plainly not been to perpetuate torts on millions of Internet users, but to 
make money.” Id. The same is true here. Accordingly, the tort or crime exception to the consent 
exception will be unavailing for Plaintiffs to show absence of consent. Therefore, individualized 
inquiries will be needed to determine what each Class member knew.  
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Plaintiffs’ theory, a fact-finder would have to evaluate whether consent could be implied from the 
specific set of Google disclosures that each individual user encountered. 
Second, the Court also sees no basis as to why the disclosures relevant to a fact-finder’s 
determination of implied consent should be limited exclusively to Google disclosures. As discussed 
above, courts have held that the question of implied consent turns on whether the party whose 
communications were intercepted had notice of the interception or consented to the interception 
based on all of the surrounding circumstances. Berry, 146 F.3d at 1011; Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 
117; Amen, 831 F.2d at 378. Plaintiffs do not cite any authority limiting the sources from which 
such notice or knowledge can be acquired, nor could this Court find such authority. Accordingly, 
the Court concludes that the full panoply of disclosures, from the news media, from Google, and 
from other sources, is relevant to the question of whether consent to the alleged interceptions 
should be implied from the surrounding circumstances. Plaintiffs contend that relying on extrinsic 
evidence outside of Google’s agreements with Class members would violate the parol evidence 
rule or that consideration of such evidence would be prohibited by the merger clause in the TOS. 
While these could be valid contentions if Plaintiffs stated a breach of contract cause of action, these 
are not viable arguments with respect to the consent under the Wiretap Act, which requires the 
fact-finder to consider all the surrounding circumstances to determine whether an individual knew 
that her communications would be intercepted. Amen, 831 F.2d at 378 (holding that the critical 
question with respect to implied consent is whether consent can be implied “in fact from 
surrounding circumstances indicating that the [plaintiffs] knowingly agreed to the surveillance”). 
Plaintiffs rely exclusively on a Northern District of Illinois case, Harris v. comScore, Inc., 
292 F.R.D. 579, 585 (N.D. Ill. 2013), for their proposition regarding the parol evidence rule. The 
Court, however, finds Harris unpersuasive. The Harris court held that “ComScore [the intercepting 
entity] contends that the scope of consent will vary for each plaintiff depending on his subjective 
understanding of the agreement and the surrounding circumstances. In support, comScore notes 
that at least under the ECPA, consent need not be explicit, but can also be implied from the 
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surrounding circumstances. But that rule has no place where a party manifested consent through 
the adoption of a form contract.” Harris, 292 F.R.D. at 585 (internal citations omitted). For the 
proposition in the last sentence, however, Harris merely cited a Seventh Circuit case interpreting 
Illinois contract law. The Harris court did not address the long line of cases that suggest a broader 
swath of materials is relevant to implied consent under the Wiretap Act. This Court concludes that 
unlike Illinois contract law, under which the subjective intent of the parties must give way to the 
terms of the contract that embody the parties’ mutual assent, see Nat’l Prod. Workers Union Ins. 
Trust v. Cigna Corp., 665 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2011), the question of implied consent to 
interceptions prohibited by the Wiretap Act necessarily requires an inquiry into what the party 
whose communications were intercepted subjectively understood.  
Moreover, Harris, even if applicable, is distinguishable. In Harris, the user had a direct 
contract with the service provider, in which the user must have agreed to the user licensing 
agreement before she could use the software that engaged in the alleged interceptions. Id. at 582 
(“The consumer must check either ‘Accept’ or ‘Decline’ before he may click ‘Next’ to proceed 
with downloading the free digital product. OSSProxy will download and install on the consumer's 
computer only if the consumer checks ‘Accept.’” (internal citations omitted)). In contrast, here, 
neither the Cable One nor Education Class members (who are end users) had any direct contractual 
relationship with Google. Moreover, in Harris, unlike this case, there were no potential other 
sources of disclosure, such as news articles, to which Class members in the instant litigation could 
have been exposed.   
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ contention that a finder of fact may only look to the agreements 
between Google and its users in determining consent improperly collapses express and implied 
consent. The agreements between Google and its users define the scope of the universe of material 
that the Court may consider in determining whether Plaintiffs have expressly consented. If the fact-
finder were limited to the same material for purposes of determining implied consent, then express 
and implied consent would be coterminous. Courts have recognized, however, that express and 
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implied consent are analytically distinct. Berry, 146 F.3d at 1011 (noting that even “[w]ithout 
actual notice,” consent can be implied “when the surrounding circumstances convincingly show 
that the party knew about and consented to the interception” (emphasis added; internal citations 
and alterations omitted)). It is only logical, in light of this recognition, for a finder of fact to be 
allowed to consider a broader set of materials in answering the factual question of whether users 
impliedly consented to the interceptions.14  
Finally, Plaintiffs raised a new theory at the hearing on the instant Motion to contend that 
consent was a common question. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that the existence of various 
third-party disclosures is irrelevant, because these disclosures could not have alerted Class 
members to the method of interceptions. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that in  2010, the Google 
device that intercepted emails shifted from the CAT2 Mixer,  
, to the COB, which scans all 
emails . Plaintiffs contend that the pre-  2010 third-party 
disclosures could have only alerted Class members about CAT2’s processing, not COB’s. 
The Court is not persuaded. To find implied consent, a fact-finder need not determine email 
users had specific knowledge of the particular devices that intercepted their emails. Rather, the 
fact-finder need only be convinced based on the surrounding circumstances that email users were 
notified of interceptions. Berry, 146 F.3d at 1011 (noting that “[t]he key question in [the implied 
consent] inquiry obviously is whether parties were given sufficient notice” of the interceptions). To 
be relevant to this factual inquiry, a disclosure does not need to provide the specific devices at 
                                                          
14 Plaintiffs’ reliance on the deposition testimony of Google’s 30(b)(6) witness on consent, Aaron 
Rothman, is misplaced. Plaintiffs rely on Mr. Rothman’s testimony in response to counsel’s 
question regarding how an average user would know that Google interprets words in emails for 
meaning that “it is very clear in—in the multitude of documents provided by Google.” Mot. at 21 
(citing Rommel Decl., Ex. I (“Rothman Depo.”) at 298). Plaintiffs overread Mr. Rothman’s 
testimony. In that part of Mr. Rothman’s testimony, he was merely contending that Google’s 
policies are sufficient to establish express consent. He was not, as Plaintiffs suggest, contending 
that the documents provided by Google were the sole sources from which users could learn of 
Google’s alleged interceptions.  
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issue. Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 117 (“The circumstances relevant to an implication of consent will 
vary from case to case, but the compendium will ordinarily include language or acts which tend to 
prove (or disprove) that a party knows of, or assents to, encroachments on the routine expectation 
that conversations are private.”). Rather, a fact-finder could find implied consent even based on 
broad disclosures. Therefore, the Court finds that Google may rely on news articles to argue to the 
finder of fact that users impliedly consented, even if those news articles do not recite the specific 
devices that are alleged to have intercepted Class members’ emails.  
Even if the Court were to accept Plaintiffs’ contention that the pre-  2010 
disclosures could not have alerted users to COB processing, which did not exist at that point, the 
Court would still conclude that individualized questions predominate with respect to consent 
because of the panoply of post-  2010 disclosures that could be found to have put Class 
members on notice. For example, a 2012 Wall Street Journal article regarding Google’s 
consolidation of Privacy Policies informed users that “you may have noticed ads in your Gmail 
based on emails you had typed. Those appear because Google scans the content of emails for 
things like keywords that may be relevant for advertising.” Wong Decl., Ex. 53. Similarly, an 
October 22, 2012, New York Times article about Microsoft’s privacy policies states that “[t]he 
Microsoft policy appeared to give the company the same rights as Google, which scans the content 
of e-mails sent through its Gmail system, focusing on keywords to generate advertising that it 
thinks will interest the user.” Id., Ex. 55. Therefore, even if pre-  2010 disclosures were not 
relevant to the implied consent inquiry, the Court would conclude that the post-  2010 
disclosures give rise to numerous individual inquiries regarding individual Class members’ 
knowledge of the interceptions. Plaintiffs’ sole contention with respect to these post-  2010 
disclosures is that these disclosures could not have disclosed COB processing, because Google has 
stated that the operation of the COB is a trade secret. The Court finds, however, that even if these 
disclosures did not specifically name COB processing, a fact-finder could conclude that these 
disclosures are sufficient surrounding circumstances to imply that email users “knowingly agreed 
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to the surveillance,” that is, the interceptions of their emails for purposes of targeted advertisements 
and user profiles. Amen, 831 F.2d at 378. 
C. Conclusion Regarding Predominance 
In sum, the Court finds that a fact-finder would have to determine to what disclosures each 
Class member was exposed and whether such disclosures were sufficient to conclude, under the 
Wiretap Act, that Class members consented to the alleged Google interceptions of email. This 
factual inquiry is an intensely individualized one. Furthermore, the myriad disclosures among the 
various Google Apps for Education Administrators raise a variety of individualized questions 
regarding express consent for the Education Class. The individualized questions with respect to 
consent, which will likely be Google’s principal affirmative defense, are likely to overwhelm any 
common issues. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have met their burden of 
demonstrating that the proposed Classes satisfy the predominance requirement.  
 This Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate predominance is consonant with 
Murray v. Fin. Visions, Inc., No. 07-2578, 2008 WL 4850328 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2008). Murray 
concerned a Wiretap Act claim brought by a putative class of employees, who sold securities and 
other investment products, against their employer, a broker-dealer and investment advisor. Id. at 
*1.  The employees had contracted with a website hosting service approved by the employer for 
website and email services. Id. The employer asked the website hosting service to intercept and 
automatically transmit all email sent from or received by any employees to the employer. Id. The 
Murray court denied class certification, finding that individual issues predominate with respect to 
consent. Id. at *4. The court held that “[t]he question of consent, either express or implied, is often 
a fact-intensive inquiry and may vary with the circumstances of the parties.” Id.  
The individualized nature of the consent inquiry in the instant case is even clearer than that 
in Murray. In Murray, the sole source of disclosures, whether from the employer or from other 
sources, was the SEC regulation and the Murray court found that there would be individualized 
inquiries regarding the impact of that regulation on employees’ knowledge and conduct. In 
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contrast, here, there are many more disclosures, from Google itself and from the news media, 
which were unlikely to be uniformly viewed by members of the putative Classes. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that individualized issues of consent would overwhelm any individual questions.    
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification. In 
one sentence on the last page of Plaintiffs’ Reply brief, Plaintiffs request to refile their Motion for 
Class Certification if this Court were to deny the instant Motion so that Plaintiffs may seek 
certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking injunctive relief. See Reply at 20, n.52. The Court 
rejects Plaintiffs’ request. Plaintiffs have briefed Class Certification three times, and class 
discovery closed in Dunbar on October 25, 2011. Dunbar II, ECF No. 226, at 3. To the extent that 
Plaintiffs intended to seek class certification under any theory, Plaintiffs should have done so in the 
instant Motion. Moreover, Plaintiffs could have requested an opportunity to refile in their Motion, 
but only sought such relief at the end of their Reply. See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 
(9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the Court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in the 
Reply). Entertaining Plaintiffs’ belated request would prejudice Google, which has been opposing 
class certification motions in this litigation since September 2011, and which did not have the 
opportunity in the briefing on the instant Motion to oppose Plaintiffs’ request to refile. Moreover, 
the Court finds that when asked about Plaintiffs’ request to refile at the hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel 
did not provide any persuasive basis for allowing such refiling. Tr. 61:15-63:18. Accordingly, the 
denial of the Class Certification Motion is with prejudice.  
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated:  March 18, 2014    _________________________________ 
 LUCY H. KOH 
 United States District Judge 
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